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Paying for patented drugs is hard to justify: an argument
about time discounting and medical need
Abstract
Drugs are much more expensive whilst they are subject to patent protection than once 
patents expire: patented drugs make up only 20% of NHS drugs prescriptions, but 
consume 80% of the total NHS drugs bill. This paper argues that, given the relatively 
uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all 
are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups, it is more difficult than is usually
thought to justify why publicly funded healthcare systems should pay for patented 
treatments. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given 
condition once the patent runs out is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but
we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource in the future. Hence, 
when resource constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare 
systems ought to wait until patents expire before approving drugs for general use in the 
publicly funded system.
1 Introduction 
It is often taken for granted that publicly funded single-payer health systems such as the
UK’s NHS and Canada’s Medicare should ensure that those covered by the system have
as  wide  access  as  possible  to  patented  drugs.  When  new  drugs  for  treating
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life-threatening  conditions  such  as  cancer  are  withheld  because  they  are  not
cost-effective enough, there are  frequently complaints and negative media coverage,
with  the  result  that  politicians  have  become  very  wary  of  making  the  case  for
cost-effectiveness. 
This  paper  presents  a  fundamental  challenge  to  such views.  Given the  relatively
uncontroversial assumption that we should save the greater number in cases where all
are equally deserving and we cannot save both groups,  I  argue that  where resource
constraints entail that both cannot be funded, publicly funded healthcare systems ought
to  wait  until  patents  expire  before  approving  drugs  for  general  use  in  the  publicly
funded system. The claim to medical treatment of those who will be sick with a given
condition once the patent expires is just as strong as those who are sick with it now, but
we will be able to treat more people with the same unit of resource. 
There are four main types of argument which could be deployed by those who wish
to claim that  despite  the fact  that  we should save the greater  number when we are
dealing with two groups of strangers and cannot save both, we should spend our money
now on patented drugs rather than saving more people in the future. None is plausible.
The first is that we should discount future health benefits. I argue that the health benefit
that a drug provides will in general be the same once the patent expires as it is now,1 and
so it would be wrong to apply a discount rate to these future health benefits unless we
think that the mere fact that a benefit is further away makes it legitimate to discount it. I
argue that such pure time discounting is implausible: whilst it is obvious that different
people require medical treatment at different times, there is no justification for thinking
that the time at which a medical need occurs should make a difference to its moral
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weight.
Second, someone might appeal to contextual features which make it appropriate to
give priority  to  those who are  ill  now, even if  their  needs  are  objectively  no more
important than those of people in the future. As in a rescue situation, it might be argued
that it is appropriate to respond with whatever materials are at our disposal, despite the
fact that doing so will use up resources that could have been used to save other lives
more cost-effectively. I argue that this objection rests on a morally mistaken framing of
the situation. We are invited to think of the people who are now in need of treatment as
exceptional.  However when viewed from a public policy perspective,  people getting
sick and dying is not exceptional or unprecedented. Performing expensive ‘rescues’ is
indefensible as an approach to public policy where the foreseeable cost of so doing is
that many more will not be rescued when they become sick in the near future. 
The  third  objection  appeals  to  equality.  Healthcare  is  a  good  which  is  widely
considered  to  be  of  special  moral  status;  and  so  it  might  be  argued  that  there  is
something worryingly unequal about a healthcare system where the vast majority are
deprived access to the latest life-saving medicines, whilst the rich few can afford them. I
agree that there is something morally troubling about people dying who could have been
saved. But given the agreed common ground that there are not enough resources to meet
all healthcare needs, whatever we do people will die who could have been saved under a
different allocation of resources. So the fact that people will die under my proposal who
would not die under our current system does not militate strongly against my proposal:
the relevant question is which distribution of resources provides the fairest prioritisation
of treatments. 
4
The final and most important objection appeals to the role of patents in incentivising
development  of  new  drugs.  If  publicly  funded  healthcare  systems  withdrew  from
funding patented drugs, this would lead to fewer new drugs being produced. This worry
is a very real one, but it can be addressed in two ways, depending  on the viability of
non-patent based approaches to drug development.  First,  squarely within the current
patent system, publicly funded healthcare systems can adopt a system of value-based
pricing,  which  adds  an  additional  weighting  for  pharmaceutical  innovation  to
cost-effectiveness calculations. Applying such a weighting would bring additional new
medicines within the confines of what would be supplied. Second, both the fairness and
the effectiveness of the patent system as a way of incentivising drug development are
increasingly  being  called  into  question.  If  it  is  correct  to  suppose  that  alternative
approaches would provide fairer or more effective ways to fund drug development, then
an obvious solution  would be for publicly funded healthcare systems to support drug
innovation by making a proportionate contribution to such schemes. 
2 Drug patents, drug development and drug prices
Formulae for making drugs are, unless subject to intellectual property regulation, public
goods: they are nonrival in use, and nonexcludable. Standard economic theory tells us
that,  unless  we  do  something  to  incentivise  their  production,  we  should  expect  a
shortfall  of  public  goods.  The basic  problem is  that  it  will  tend to  be irrational  (in
self-interested terms) for an agent to expend his own time and money creating a public
good, given that everyone else will be able to benefit from the public good as much as
he will. It is better for him to allow someone else to do the hard work, and then take a
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free ride on others' efforts. But of course, it will tend to be irrational for anyone else to
put the effort in either. 
The patent system aims to solve the problem of the production of public goods by
making ideas excludable.  It  creates an incentive to innovative work,  by providing a
temporary monopoly over the commercial exploitation of the product as stated in the
patent claim. By allowing the inventor a monopoly, the patent system allows him to
recoup his development costs and return a profit by charging a price much higher than
the price he could charge if there were open competition. 
Drug discovery is an expensive process. If we include the costs of pharmaceutical
companies’ failures  and  marketing,  the  cost  of  bringing  a  new  drug  to  market  is
estimated  to  be  in  the  order  of  $800  million.2 Whilst  the  patent  term is  20  years,
companies  file  their  patent  claim  early  in  the  drug  development  process.  It  takes
between 8-13 years from the filing date to the point at which the drug actually becomes
available for sale.3 The net result is that once a new drug comes onto the market and is
available for sale, the effective patent term will be somewhere between 7-12 years. 
A generic  drug  is  one  that  is  identical  in  action  (or  to  use  the  technical  term,
bioequivalent) to a patented drug, and hence is “identical…to a brand name drug in
dosage  form,  safety,  strength,  route  of  administration,  quality,  performance
characteristics and intended use.”4 After the expiry of the patent, anyone can produce a
generic version of the drug using the same process as claimed in the patent, without
having to pay any licence fees to the company which developed it. Developing generic
drugs is much cheaper than developing New Chemical Entities for two reasons. First,
the search costs are minimal: the chemical structure of the branded drug can easily be
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reverse-engineered by chemists (who additionally have the disclosures in the original
patent  application  to  rely  on).  Second,  the  testing  costs  are  also  vastly  reduced  as
generics manufacturers have only to show that their drug is bioequivalent to the branded
drug, rather than to complete the full schedule of clinical trials. 
From the point that a generic is available, the branded drug will become much less
profitable for the company who developed it. Hence pharmaceutical companies aim to
recoup the costs of drug development and earn their profits in the effective patent time
window. Inevitably the prices of patented drugs are vastly greater than the price would
be under competition from multiple generics. 
Costs savings are considerable when generics become available: for instance a recent
EU  competition  inquiry  into  the  pharmaceutical  sector  found  that,  in  the  period
2000-07,  generic  medicines  were  introduced  an  average  of  seven  months  after  the
expiry of the patent (four months with the most popular drugs).5 Initial cost savings
were around 25% of the former cost of the branded drug. After generics had been on the
market for two years, prices were on average 40% cheaper than the branded drug had
been.6 And as  more  competitors  enter  the  market,  generics  prices  continue  to  fall.7
According to  the  Generic  Pharmaceutical  Association  (GPhA),  generics  account  for
only 16% of costs, but 69% of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States, whilst
branded drugs account for 84% of the costs of drugs, and a mere 31% of prescriptions.8
In the UK’s NHS it is estimated that generics account for 80% of the prescriptions, but
only 20% of the overall drugs budget. Branded drugs take up the remaining 80% of the
overall drugs budget, but yet only account for only 20% of the number of prescriptions.9
In Europe as a whole, generics amount to more than 50% of the prescriptions filled, but
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only 18% of the costs.10 
3 How Generics Allow us to Save the Greater Number
I shall assume that under conditions of resource scarcity, our distribution should adhere
to the following schematic principle: moral choices about which of two groups should
get a scarce resource that cannot be provided to both should be determined both on the
strength of the moral claim each individual in each of the groups has to the good, and
the number of individuals in each group. Where the moral claims of the individuals in
each group are all equally strong, we should give the resource to the more numerous
group.11 Where two groups are of the same size, we should give the resource to the
group with the strongest moral claim.12
I take it that consequentialist positions will find the schematic principle congenial –
seeing as all forms of consequentialism are simply ways of filling out this schema. Most
nonconsequentialist positions (and commonsense morality) should also agree with the
principle: to oppose it, one would have to be either a sceptic about saving the greater
number, or a sceptic about saving the more deserving. I am not aware that anyone has
defended scepticism about saving the most deserving, as it  is a position of doubtful
coherence: it  would amount to the claim that  despite  the fact  that group A is  more
deserving (according to whichever metric of deservingness is the correct one) of the
resource than group B and at least as numerous, there is no duty to award the resource to
group A in preference to group B.
Scepticism about saving the greater number is more reputable: John Taurek argues
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that there is no moral duty to save the group with the greater number in the following
kinds of case:13
1. The agent can save either a smaller or a larger group of innocent people from
(equally) serious harm.
2. The costs of saving either the smaller or the larger number will be the same.
3. The agent has a duty to save at least one of the groups.
4. If the agent acts to prevent harm, then the harm they prevent would not have
been prevented if they had done nothing.
5. All other things are equal.14
I shall not argue against numbers scepticism here.15 My argument is in this sense
hypothetical:  if we should reject numbers scepticism, then we should accept my more
general principle for allocation of scarce resources.
Assuming that  the  schematic  resource  allocation  principle  is  accepted,  it  follows
straightforwardly that we should prefer to fund the generic to its patented equivalent.
This is because, for a given unit of resource, buying the branded drug would allow the
healthcare  system to provide  treatment  for  n  people whose  claim to  treatment  is  s.
Buying the generic drug would allow the healthcare system to provide treatment for n
people  whose claim to treatment  is  s,  and an additional  m  persons with  a  claim to
treatment of s. 
The  same  principle,  when  combined  with  a  claim  about  the  wrongness  of
time-discounting which I shall defend shortly, entails that publicly funded healthcare
systems should often wait until  drugs come of patent before making them generally
available: 
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1. We should not discount claims to treatment solely because they are in the
future.
2. If we buy the patented drug now, then for $X we will  be able to provide
treatment for n people whose claim to treatment is s.
3. If we buy the generic version in ten years’ time, then for $X we will be able
to provide treatment for n+m people whose claim to treatment is s.
4. When choosing between two different groups composed of individuals who
each have an equal claim to treatment, we should give preference to treating
the larger group. 
5. Therefore,  treating  the  larger  number  with  the  generic  drug  in  ten  years
should have a higher priority than treating the smaller number now. 
I acknowledge that it is artificial to suppose that publicly funded health care systems
have hypothecated sums of money for different drugs, and that it is also unrealistic to
expect that governments would set up a large number of bank accounts and leave $X in
each account until a given drug patent ran out. But I hope that this does not obscure the
moral point of the argument, which is simply that if a government has a responsibility to
use scarce resources fairly, it is morally unjustifiable to spend money now to meet a
number of needs of a certain moral urgency if that precludes meeting a greater number
of needs of the same moral urgency in the future. 
Depending on the size of a given healthcare budget and our theory of the urgency of
medical need, it may be that  both providing the patented drug now to  n  people,  and
providing it to n+m people once the patent expires are of sufficiently high priority that
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both  should  be  provided.16 On  many  substantive  accounts  of  the  moral  urgency  of
medical need, some new patented drugs will come higher up the list of priorities than
some already funded  nonpatented treatments:  if  the new patented drug allows us to
provide  treatment  to  n  people  with  a  moral  urgency  of  need  of  s,  whilst  another
nonpatented treatment we are currently funding allows us only to provide treatment to
n-m people with a moral urgency of need of s, then providing the patented drug should
be prioritised over this nonpatented treatment.17
So the argument does not establish the claim that publicly funded healthcare systems
should  never  fund patented  treatments,  but  rather  that  they should not  do so at  the
expense of providing treatments to larger groups of individuals whose individual claims
to treatment are or will be equally strong as those who are now sick. However, this does
not mean that the argument is toothless: the fact that  we cannot meet all  healthcare
needs with current budgets, and think that there is no reason to make current healthcare
budgets radically larger is a strong reason to think that some, perhaps many, patented
treatments would not reach the cutoff point.18
Patents on antibiotics
The effectiveness of some drugs (for example statins) will remain constant over tens or 
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hundreds of years of wide use. However, antibiotics diminish in effectiveness as their 
usage increases because the pathogens they target tend to acquire resistance.19 
Where a drug can be expected to decline in effectiveness over time, it will not provide
precisely the same level of health benefit once the patent expires as it did previously.
But this does not provide a reason to think that we should use more of the drug whilst it
is under patent, for two reasons. First, the sharp change in legal status between in patent
and out of patent has no effect in itself on the level of resistance to a particular drug.20
Second, the main factor that increases antibiotic resistance is use of antibiotics. Hence
the situation is not like one in which the freezer breaks down and one is forced to eat
one's way through several tubs of ice cream to stop them from going to waste, but more
like discovering an oil reserve, which could equally as well be used some time in the
indefinite future. 
Where there are are no worries of spoilage, the fact that if we use more of a limited
resource now, there will be less of it in the future, does not provide a reason for using
more of the limited resource now. Rather, it  provides a reason for thinking that this
limited resource should be distributed in a way that gives priority to those who have the
strongest overall claim to it. I argue elsewhere that ownership of a patent on a particular
antibiotic does not bring with it a moral entitlement to use up the underlying resource of
the effectiveness of the antibiotic.21 Assuming this argument is sound, the key question
(just as in cases where the effectiveness of a drug does not decline over time) is whether
people who need treatment now have systematically stronger claims than those who will
require treatment in the future, a question I examine in the next section.
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4 Time discounting and future benefits
I claim that the point in time at which we can provide a treatment does not make a
difference to the moral urgency of providing that treatment. However, such a position
can be challenged. It can be argued that we should subject future benefits to a discount
rate—that is, to treat them as less valuable the further away they are. We can distinguish
between  two  different  types  of  discounting:  discounting  of  commodities,  and  pure
discounting. 
It is standard in economics to apply a discount rate to commodities. The price of
most commodities falls over time relative to the return we could get on an investment at
a bank, so buying a commodity today has the opportunity cost of the greater amount of
the same goods we could buy in the future. The price of commodities falls over time
relative to the return on a bank investment both because we become more efficient at
manufacturing commodities over time, and because natural resources such as forests
grow naturally  if  we wait  before harvesting them. Broome dubs this  the fertility  of
technology: as he puts it, “present commodities can be converted into a greater quantity
of future commodities, if we choose”.22 Given these facts it makes sense to employ a
discount  rate  for  commodities  because  we will be able  to  buy more of  those  same
commodities for our money in the future. 
Patented drugs are commodities whose price falls over time, so it might be thought
that we should discount the future value of the health benefits they produce. However,
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this  does  not  follow:  the  economists’ discounting model  assumes that  the  increased
number of commodities we would be able to buy in the future have the same value for
wellbeing as the smaller bundle we can buy now. However not all commodities vary in
this  way  relative  to  wellbeing:  some  commodities  contribute  a  constant  amount  to
wellbeing whenever they occur. Broome’s example is saving a life: 
Lifesaving in the future will make the same contribution to well-being as
lifesaving in the present. Certainly, future lifesaving is cheaper than present
lifesaving, but this is not a reason for valuing it less. The market prices of
commodities  only  have  a  role  in  valuations  because  they  measure  the
relative values of commodities to people. In equilibrium, they will do so...
But  if  lifesaving produces  constant  well-being  and yet  is  cheaper  in  the
future, we evidently do not have an equilibrium.23
In short,  just because we could create health benefits more cheaply in the future,
there is no reason to think that the health benefits thus created should be subject to
commodity discounting. 
Pure discounting means discounting the value of benefits and harms in the future
solely for the reason that they are in the future.24 I  shall  attempt to argue that pure
discounting is implausible; however, I shall conclude this section by arguing that even if
we do adopt a pure discount rate, it would not provide a cogent justification for paying
for patented treatments.
Suppose we have two ambulance drivers, Prometheus and Epimetheus. Prometheus,
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like  his  mythic  namesake,  has  the  power  of  foresight:  he  can  tell  (within  narrow
confidence intervals) what is going to happen in the near future. He can predict with
great accuracy at the start of his shift how many emergencies there will be, and the
number of people who will be harmed (and how severely harmed) in each. Epimetheus
has  no  such  superpowers.  For  Epimetheus,  the  moral  demands  of  the  job  are
straightforward: he is to go to where people need urgent medical attention, as soon as he
is called. 
However Prometheus’s greater knowledge gives him greater possibilities. He could
act just in the same way as Epimetheus does—waiting till people require rescuing, and
then heading over to them as quickly as possible. However, doing this is likely to have
large opportunity costs. Given that (we stipulate) he is the only ambulance driver in the
town, it will often be the case that if he prioritises whoever needs saving now, he will
not then be able to save a larger group of no less deserving people who are not yet in
distress, but who (he correctly predicts) will shortly require rescue. 
Given the knowledge that Prometheus has,  I  think it  would be wrong for him to
prioritise those who need saving now, where that would have the predictable effect that
more people who are equally as deserving of rescue will not be saved. My reason for
saying this is simple: the time at which one becomes morally needy ought not to make a
difference to the strength of one’s moral claim. At the point when each person needs
rescuing he or she is equally as needy as any of the others when he or she requires
rescue. It is just that different people reach the point at which they need to be rescued at
different  times.  Relying  on  a  “first-come,  first-served”  model  would  be  morally
arbitrary, and where applying it would lead us to save less people that we otherwise
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could, it is morally indefensible.
The future benefits reductio
It  might  be thought  that  this  argument  is  subject  to  a  reductio ad absurdum. Drugs
continue to fall in price once they have come off patent, and other medical procedures
will also be able to be performed more cheaply in the future. If the argument establishes
that publicly funded health care systems should not pay for patented drugs, then it must
also establish that publicly funded healthcare systems should not pay for drugs at all,
for these same treatments will always be available more cheaply in the future. Call this
the future benefits reductio.25 The claim that we should not provide treatment to anyone
now appears to be clearly false; so it would follow that the argument which establishes
that publicly funded health care systems should not pay for patented drugs must be
unsound.
This objection relies on a misunderstanding of my argument. I have proposed that
our theory of the moral urgency of providing treatment – what ever other features it
should have – should be atemporal. In other words, we should rank indviduals for moral
urgency of treatment by a criterion which does not invoke temporal priority. The future
benefits reductio is the worry that given that we will be able to provide treatments much
more cost-effectively in  the distant future,  anyone now alive will  come towards the
bottom of the list when it comes to prioritisation, and so would not be treated now. 
However,  this  conclusion  does  not  follow  from  the  atemporal  approach.  The
atemporal approach tells us only which claims to treatment should appear higher up the
list when we are trying to answer the question “which treatments should we fund when
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we cannot afford to fund them all”. The fact that there is a group Y who will in the
future have the condition that Group X now have, and that Y will be able to be treated
much more cost-effectively than X is a reason not to treat X now only if we cannot both
treat  X now and  treat  Y in  the  future.  If  medical  treatments  are  getting  more  cost
effective over the long term that is a reason for thinking that treatments which seem
affordable now, given our current health budget,  will  be ranked high enough on the
atemporal list for it to be reasonable to provide them.26
Nonzero Pure Discount Rates
Even if  my argument against  pure discounting is  rejected,  it  is  difficult  to see how
adopting a nonzero pure discount rate could provide a cogent reason to prefer using
drugs whilst still on patent. In order for pure discounting to do so, it would need to be
the case that the larger medical benefit to be gained in the future, when depreciated by
the pure discount rate, becomes less than the smaller medical benefit obtainable whilst
the drug is on patent. Given that patents typically have only another 10 years to run
once the drug reaches the market, and that the prices of generic drugs will be much
cheaper than patented ones, the pure discount rate would have to be high to justify using
the money to buy a patented drug now rather than providing a treatment for more people
once the patent expired. In order for it to be better to put the money into a patented drug
now, the pure discount rate would need to be at least 3%.27 If we adopted this pure
discount rate, then a benefit 30 years in the future would be worth only 40% of what
that same benefit would worth now, one 60 years would be worth 16%, whilst a benefit
in 100 years would be worth less than 5% of one now. 
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But if such a pure discount rate were correct for health harms and benefits, then it
would (unless there is  some distinguishing feature)  have to  be true for other  future
harms and benefits, such as those due to climate change.28 If we adopted such a high
pure discount rate, it would not be wrong to make things much worse for people as little
as ten years in the future, because we would be able to legitimately discount greatly the
important of their  future wellbeing.  This seems clearly unacceptable.  So even if we
should  adopt  a  nonzero  pure  discount  rate,  it  is  implausible  to  think  that  the  pure
discount rate would be high enough to provide a reason to reject my argument. 
5 The Rule of Rescue 
Another objection focuses on the moral importance of the fact  that  the people who
currently need treatment are sick  now.  When a child falls down a well, or miners get
trapped below ground, hardly anyone thinks it a bad thing if a massive rescue operation
is mounted,  even if  the money spent  on this  rescue could save rather more lives if
devoted to more cost-effective ways of improving human lives. So, appealing to the
same considerations, we could argue that the  presentness of current need allows us to
legitimately  prioritise  it,  even  though  we  could  treat  more  citizens  with  medical
conditions of the same moral urgency if we were to prioritise our resources atemporally.
Albert Jonsen christened our response to such cases the Rule of Rescue.29 
I do not want to deny the emotional force of rescue cases of this kind, but it would be
mistaken to use such emotions as a basis for public policy. Our intuitions about rescue
are heavily affected by factors which are morally arbitrary. For instance, they are more
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likely to be triggered by a large percentage of a small group in peril than a smaller
percentage of a larger group.30 They are triggered by identifiable individuals rather than
statistical lives. And they are more likely to be triggered by a sudden drop in wellbeing
for someone than by a gradual drop, or by the fact that someone has been in a bad way
for a very long time. But none of these seem like very cogent moral reasons.31
More importantly, the psychological effects of the impulse to rescue depend on us
framing the situation as an exceptional one in which a sudden and unexpected calamity
is avertible by swift action. But it is doubly mistaken to view the design of publicly
funded healthcare systems through this lens. First, patterns of morbidity and mortality
are not unexpected when we ascend to a policy level. Whilst for any given person, a
stroke or a road traffic accident may be a sudden and unexpected catastrophe, we have a
great  deal of epidemiological research which will  allow us to  predict—within fairly
narrow confidence intervals—the expected number of strokes and road traffic accidents
in a country each year. It is simply a dereliction of a government’s duty if it does not
collect  such data,  and plan  policies  on  the  basis  of  the  expected  statistics  for  each
disease.  Given  the  availability  of  epidemiological  data,  publicly  funded  healthcare
systems are in  a  situation like Prometheus rather  than Epimetheus,  and so they too
should be unmoved by concerns of presentness.
Second, from a policy level it is mistaken to assume that each case where death is
imminent  should be treated in  accordance with the rule  of rescue.  Getting sick and
dying is the rule, not the exception. It is the human condition, and will be with us for as
long as there are human beings.32
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6 Arguments from equality of access
Healthcare is a good which is widely considered to be of special moral status.33 It might
be thought that there is  something worryingly unequal about a healthcare system in
which poorer citizens are deprived of access to the latest  life-saving medicines.  My
suggestion, it might be argued, would create a two-tier system: those who have to stick
with the generics they can get from the publicly funded healthcare system, and those
who are rich enough to privately purchase expensive patented drugs for their condition. 
I agree that this is a genuine worry, but we should notice that problems of unequal
access are endemic to any attempt to contain drug costs. As things stand, some patented
drugs are already excluded from being funded in public healthcare systems because they
are  not  cost-effective  enough.  Given  a  limited  budget,  publicly  funded  healthcare
systems must choose either (1) to fund all drugs, regardless of their cost-effectiveness,
or decide that some drugs are not cost-effective enough to fund. If they decide that some
drugs are not cost-effective enough to fund, they can either (2) prevent those drugs
being made available to those who want to buy them privately, or (3) allow those drugs
to be bought privately. Option (1) is a denial of the problem, rather than a plausible
solution to it. Cost containment strategies have been introduced in healthcare because
we do not have enough resources to meet everyone’s healthcare needs. It is perverse to
respond to this scarcity by insisting that all drugs should be provided, regardless of their
expense. Publicly funded healthcare systems should adopt either option (2), or option
(3): my argument here does take a stance on which is to be preferred.
 Cost containment of patented drugs is not new. What my argument provides is a
different,  and  more  morally  compelling  argument  for  withholding  access  to  some
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patented  treatments.  Whether  healthcare  systems  persuaded  by  my argument  would
allow systematically less access to patented treatments than current systems will depend
both on the size of the allocated healthcare budget, and on the specifics of the account
of the moral urgency of medical need the healthcare system chooses to adopt. 
7 Funding future drug development
The purpose of the patent system is to incentivise innovation by providing a return on
investment for patentholders, and so any proposal that reduces the amount of patented
drugs bought will by the same token weaken this element of incentivisation.  If many
countries were to opt out of buying patented drugs in their publicly funded healthcare
system, then this would lead to a decline in the number of new drugs being developed,
and would be deleterious to those who were then unable to benefit from new drugs in
the future. 
This worry is a very real one. Given that the main claim I am arguing for is that
systems of resource allocation for public healthcare systems should take future claims to
treatment seriously, it would be a very serious problem if these concerns could not be
answered.34  
The  first  point  to  make  in  response  is  that  my  argument  has  been  against
over-valuing present patented treatments. It does not follow that healthcare systems that
were persuaded by my argument would fund  no  patented drugs: whether they fund a
particular patented drug will depend both on their available budget, and on how morally
urgent they think the good which can be done by the patented drug for a given unit of
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resource is. So it is possible that, consistent with my proposal, a wealthy healthcare
system might choose to fund a considerable number of patented drugs. Moreover, it
would be consistent with the scheme that I am proposing for publicly funded healthcare
systems to add an additional weighting to health gains produced by highly innovative
medicines. Applying such a weighting would bring additional new medicines within the
confines of what would be funded.35 
A second and deeper point is that both the fairness and the effectiveness of the patent
system as a way of incentivising drug development are increasingly being called into
question. The poor conversion rate of R&D spending into New Chemical Entities and
the disturbing trend for much research to go into “me too” drugs has received much
press.36 There  are  also  fundamental  questions  of  fairness  in  the  diseases  which
commercial companies target: diseases which are prevalent only in poorer countries get
far less than the share of research money dictated by their contribution to the global
burden of disease.37 
In the light of these problems, it would be premature to think that the viability of any
proposal for the purchase of pharmaceuticals should be judged by its ability to support
the patent system as it currently exists. There are a number of alternative ways in which
research into new drugs can be funded that have been argued to be both fairer and more
efficient than the current  system, including sponsoring more research into neglected
diseases, compulsory licensing as standard in developing countries,38 offering prizes for
drug  inventions,39 and  contributing  to  a  mechanism like  Thomas  Pogge  and  Aidan
Hollis's proposed Health Impact Fund.40 If it is correct to suppose that such alternative
approaches fairer or more effective ways to fund drug development, then an obvious
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solution would be for publicly funded healthcare systems to support drug innovation by
making a proportionate contribution to such schemes. 
8 Conclusion
I have argued that it is much more difficult for publicly funded healthcare systems to 
justify paying for patented drugs than is usually thought. Whatever substantive account 
of moral urgency of medical needs a healthcare system adopts, it should prioritise 
providing treatment to n+m people with a moral urgency of need of s in ten years’ time 
over providing treatment to n people with a moral urgency of need of s now. 
However, my argument in this article establishes only that where we have to choose
between  providing  the  treatment  now and  providing  it  once  the  patent  expires,  we
should provide it after the patent expires. Depending on the size of a given healthcare
budget, it may be that we can afford both to provide the patented drug now to n people,
and to provide it to n+m people once the patent expires. In such cases I would of course
advocate  that  we supply it  now.  But  not  all  cases  are  of  this  sort.  Publicly  funded
healthcare  systems  face  genuine  scarcity  of  resources:  they  cannot  fund  all  the
treatments  for  all  the  medical  needs.  Given  this  situation,  one  thing  they  should
definitely not do is to provide patented treatments now at the expense of providing more
morally urgent treatments in the future.41
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